This study examines whether pension cuts affecting current public employees encourage mid-career teachers and civil servants to separate from their employers. The analysis takes advantage of a 2005 reform to the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI) that dramatically reduced the generosity of benefits for current workers. Importantly, the cuts applied only to ERSRI members who had not vested by June 30, 2005. Vested ERSRI members and municipal government employees in Rhode Island were unaffected. This sharp difference in benefit generosity permits a triple-differences research design in which non-vested ERSRI members are compared, before and after the reform, to vested members and to all members of the Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island. The results show that the pension cut caused a 2.4-percentage-point increase in the rate of separation, implying an elasticity of labor supply with respect to pension benefits of around 0.25. Rhode Island teachers were significantly less responsive to the benefit cut than other occupations, in line with an existing literature on teacher labor supply, suggesting that the results from that literature may not generalize to the broader workforce.
Introduction
One-third of state and local defined benefit pensions are so financially troubled that government sponsors may soon need to reduce the benefits promised to current employees (Aubry, Crawford, and Wandrei 2018) . Until recently, public pension reforms rarely affected current workers, since state constitutions and statutes traditionally entitle future retirees to the pension formula in place on their date of hire (Monahan 2010; and Munnell and Quinby 2012 ).
Cuts for current workers became more common after the 2008 financial crisis, when courts around the country judged that pensions were crowding out vital government services like K-12 education and police protection (Cloud 2011; and Monahan 2017) .
1 Since then, 17 states have reduced the post-retirement cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) earned by current workers, and cuts to promised annuity payments have been successfully legislated in two states and are under discussion in two more (Munnell et al. 2016) . 2 Will these pension cuts for current state and local government employees encourage mid-career workers to leave for the private sector?
This project takes advantage of a 2005 reform to the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI) that extended the normal retirement age (NRA), reduced the annual pension benefit, and limited post-retirement COLAs for current public school teachers and state government employees. Most teachers and state employees also lost access to subsidized retiree health insurance before age 65. Importantly, the cuts applied only to ERSRI members who had not vested by June 30, 2005 (had fewer than 10 years of government service on that date).
Vested ERSRI members and municipal government employees in Rhode Island were unaffected.
This sharp difference in the generosity of benefits, based on tenure at a specific date, permits a triple-differences research design in which non-vested members of ERSRI are compared, before and after the reform, to vested members and to all members of the Municipal Employees'
Retirement System (MERS).
Although Rhode Island is a small state, it is an excellent setting for the analysis. The state government was the first to enact major pension cuts for current workers, and the depth and breadth of its pension reforms created multiple natural experiments, where otherwise similar 1 Over the course of several court cases, a consensus view has also emerged that COLAs are less protected by state statutes than the core benefits described by plan documents when the employee was hired (Reinke 2011 The results show that the pension cut caused an immediate 2.4-percentage-point increase in the rate of separation, corresponding to a 12-percent increase in the baseline separation rate.
Consistent with expectations and past literature (Koedel and Xiang 2017) , teachers in Rhode
Island were less responsive to the benefit cut than other occupations. Whereas general state employees were 4 percentage points more likely to separate due to the pension cut (a 19-percent increase in the baseline rate), teachers were only 1.7 percentage points more likely to separate (a 9-percent increase), and the difference between teachers and general state employees is statistically significant. This finding suggests that teachers' labor responses to benefit cuts may not generalize to other state and local occupations, although it could also reflect differences in treatment intensity across occupations. 4 Nevertheless, the labor supply of public employees in Rhode Island is inelastic relative to the magnitude of the pension cuts. In 2005, Rhode Island's actuaries predicted that the reform would reduce the present value of future pension benefits for active members by $243 million (ERSRI Actuarial Valuation Report 2004) . For a typical non-vested member of ERSRI, this change decreased pension wealth by 48 percent. Hence, the results imply an elasticity of labor supply with regard to pension wealth of around 0.25, which is consistent with a large literature on the wage elasticity of labor supply, but is somewhat higher than the elasticity found by a growing literature on teacher pensions. 5 The 2005 reform of ERSRI caused a large increase in separation, despite this small elasticity, because the benefit cut was also considerable. This increase in separation likely reflects a combination of income and substitution effects, as well as new information about Rhode Island's capacity to pay promised pensions, and feelings of spite.
Although the analysis does not find evidence in favor of large income effects, the complexity of these mechanisms -and potential interplays between them -make it difficult to draw firm conclusions.
Overall, this research suggests that sponsors of financially troubled pension systems must weigh the budgetary gains of benefit cuts against the costs of increased separation.
Conceptually, workers who leave their jobs impose two types of costs on employers (Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2013) . First, employers must directly expend financial resources to recruit, hire, and train replacements. Although attempts to quantify these direct costs produce widely differing estimates depending on the employer studied and the research methodology, estimates in the state and local sectors generally fall between $4,000 and $18,000 per employee.
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Assuming that government employers in Rhode Island expended a similar amount for each separated employee, the 2005 pension cut caused a one-time increase in direct turnover costs of between $1.8 million and $8.1 million -small in magnitude relative to the pension savings.
Second, separation may hurt the quality of public services if new hires are less skilled than those who leave. In Rhode Island, where government salaries do not appear to have increased to compensate for lost pension benefits, the concern is that highly skilled employees -such as teachers, nurses, and lawyers -may have selected out of public service and chosen careers in the local private sector or the public sectors in neighboring states. 7 This concern is particularly relevant given the magnitude of Rhode Island's pension cut. While the impact of the loss of more skilled workers is difficult to measure, it may be the larger cost associated with pension cuts.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of related literature. The third section describes Rhode Island's history of pension reforms and 6 Two studies of K-12 education place the direct costs between $4,000 and $18,000 per separating teacher, with large urban districts experiencing higher costs (Barnes, Crowe, and Schaefer 2007; and Watlington et al. 2010 ). Graef and Hill (2000) estimate the cost of replacing a child protective services worker at $10,000. Meanwhile, four studies of registered nurses estimate costs ranging from $24,000 to $67,000 per nurse (Jones 2005; Nursing Solutions Inc. 2016; The Lewin Group, Inc. 2009; and Waldman et al. 2004) . 7 See, for example, Bacolod (2007); Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab (2004); Figlio (1997); and Nagler, Piopiunik, and West (2015) . Separation could also reduce staff cohesion and community, with adverse effects on agency performance (Bryk and Schneider 2003; and Johnson, Harrison, and Donaldson 2005) . A large body of literature in the public and private sectors finds that organizations with high turnover also have lower productivity (see Hausknecht and Trevor 2011; and Park and Shaw 2012 for a review of this literature). However, one should be cautious when assigning a causal interpretation to the negative correlation because of reverse causality: unproductive organizations could suffer from systemic human resource problems that cause the high turnover.
details the natural experiment that occurred in 2005. The fourth section introduces the data and empirical methodology. The fifth section presents empirical results. The final section concludes that governments contemplating pension cuts should be prepared for disruptions to their workforce.
Literature Review
Despite the increasing likelihood of pension reforms for current public sector workers, how benefit cuts affect employment decisions has so far been unanswered. Most studies of the public sector labor market focus on older workers' decisions to retire, with a particular emphasis on K-12 teachers. These studies rely either on structural models relating the probability of retirement to the pension accrual formula (Costrell and Podgursky 2009; Koedel et al. 2013; Kong et al. 2018; Ni and Podgursky 2017) or on natural experiments when benefits were suddenly enhanced during the 1990s (Brown 2013; and Fitzpatrick and Lovenheim 2014) . Like similar literatures on private sector pensions and Social Security, these analyses find that retirement spikes around the ages that teachers become eligible for normal and early retirement. Pension cuts should make working for the government a less attractive option relative to other employment, encouraging some mid-career employees to leave for the private sector. The magnitude of this outflow is not obvious, since workers may heavily discount future benefits and thus not be very responsive to cuts that will affect them far in the future (as implied by Fitzpatrick 2015) .
To date, the most consistent predictions about how mid-career workers will likely respond to benefit cuts come from structural models that simulate behavior and suggest that midcareer teachers would respond modestly to changes in retirement ages, benefit multipliers, and
COLAs (Costrell and McGee 2010; and Knapp et al. 2016) . But it is difficult to determine whether these estimates would play out in reality without exploiting a natural experiment and, to our knowledge, no one has taken this route. Koedel and Xiang (2017) Gustman and Steinmeier 1993; Madrian 1994; Mitchell 1982 and 1983; and Rabe 2007 (Clark et al. 2016; and Quinby 2018 Two districts link eligibility to the ERSRI NRA -one links it to the earlier of the ERSRI early and normal retirement ages, one does not link it to ERSRI, and one does not publish the information online. 26 Based on the authors' calculations, the PDV of the pension cut (not including the implicit cut to health insurance) was around $153,000 for a worker with 25 years of tenure, while the PDV of the associated health insurance cut was around $24,000.
particularly hurt short-tenure employees, confounding the empirical analysis despite the presence of control groups. Indeed, the growth of total revenue slowed in the years leading up to pension reform, from 6.7 percent in fiscal year 2003 to 6.2 percent in 2004 and 4.9 percent in 2005.
Nevertheless, neither wages nor workforce size show discontinuous changes around the time of the reform. 27 It seems more likely that the reform was a targeted attempt to reign in ERSRI's large unfunded liabilities. The next section describes the data and quasi-experimental strategy used to estimate the effect of these benefit cuts.
Data and Methodology
As Specifically, the analysis runs the following Ordinary Least Squares regression on a balanced panel of employment records: 
In equation (2), the vector of triple-differences coefficients reflects the effect of the benefit cut on state government employees, while the vector of coefficients estimates the difference in effect size between state workers and teachers. Hence, the linear combination of and measures the effect of the benefit cut on teacher separation. Once again, elements of vectors and from the years prior to the reform serve as tests of the parallel pre-trend assumption for state workers and for the difference in trends between state workers and teachers.
33 These controls include age and service fixed effects, as well as the employee's salary, gender, and occupation (teacher, general state government, corrections officer, or nurse). The results are also robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects. The results with individual fixed effects are not reported, but available from the authors upon request, since it is difficult to interpret individual fixed effects when the outcome is an absorbing state.
Results
The analysis follows 23,676 employees between 2003 and 2008. 34 Only 12 percent of active workers in 2003 are over age 60. 35 The sample also excludes employees with zero years of tenure in 2003, since 25 percent of these observations are purportedly born in 1900 and an additional 10 percent earn zero wages despite being coded as "active" employees. Together, these tenure-based sample restrictions eliminate 25 percent of observations under age 60. A robustness check will further limit the sample to employees younger than age 53 and with fewer than 15 years of tenure in 2003 so that no one becomes retirement eligible during the analysis period. Equation (1) formalizes Figure 1 by checking for statistical significance and controlling for the pre-reform characteristics of employees. Figure 2 plots the vector of triple-differences coefficients by year ( ) as well as the 95-percent confidence interval on each. 36 The regression confirms a 1.7 to 3.2-percentage-point increase in cumulative separation that has stabilized at 2.1 percentage points by the end of 2006. The triple-differences estimates are almost all statistically significant at the 5-percent level or better, with the notable exception of 2003, which is a precisely estimated zero (see Table 3 for detailed regression results). Furthermore, in line with expectations for the low-tenure MERS employees who are, in fact, untreated by the reform, this group displays no change in separation rates in the years immediately post reform. Instead, they
show a significant decline in separations in 2008, likely reflecting the Great Recession, and further justifying use of this group as a control for ERSRI. A two-period triple-differences regression estimates the average effect across all the years to be 2.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the one-percent level.
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Given that much of the existing literature on public sector labor supply focuses on K-12 education, the next question is whether teachers respond less to benefit cuts than do state government employees. Figure 3 presents triple-differences estimates for each occupation by calculating the sum of and from equation (2). The effect on teachers is about half as large as the effect on state employees -slightly under 2 percentage points compared to 4
percentage points -and is not always statistically different from zero. 38 Detailed regression results in Table 4 reveal that these occupational differences are statistically significant.
However, given that the dynamic effects are imprecisely estimated for teachers (due to the smaller sample size), Table 5 replicates the analysis using a two-period triple-differences regression with 2005 as the first year post reform. This model again shows that the size of the effect is statistically different between the two occupations, and that the overall estimate for teachers is 1.7 percentage points, but that the estimate for teachers is only marginally statistically significant at the 10-percent level (a p-value of 0.065). 36 The regression normalizes all of the coefficients relative to the difference between the treated and control groups in the year before the reform. 37 This regression is presented in the next section as a robustness test. 38 The overall effect is calculated from Table 4 as the effect on state government employees plus the additional effect on teachers.
Interpreting the Magnitude of the Change in Labor Supply
How should one interpret the magnitude of the labor supply response generally, and why did the pension reform have a relatively small effect on teachers? Teachers may respond less to the pension cut because they enjoy their jobs more than state employees do, because they lack competitive outside options, or because the cut itself was less severe for them. To assess this last possibility, the PDV of future pension benefits is recalculated under the pre-and post-reform provisions for a hypothetical teacher and state employee. unlikely that teachers are half as responsive because they kept more of their old pension wealth.
Similarly, retiree health insurance is unlikely to fully account for the occupational differences in labor supply because the PDV of lost health benefits was only around 15 percent of the PDV of lost pension benefits, and some school districts (including Providence, the capital) also link insurance eligibility to the teacher's NRA, paralleling state workers' eligibility criteria.
Although teachers and state employees seem to face different labor market conditions, it is unclear whether either group experienced an economically meaningful change in separation.
One possible reference point is the overall probability of separation, which makes the effect of pension reform appear moderately large. Among the non-vested ERSRI members employed in 2003, 22 percent had separated from active service by 2008. Hence, a 2.4-percentage-point increase in the separation rate corresponds to a 12-percent increase in the baseline (no reform) rate. By occupation, the benefit cut caused a 19-percent increase in the baseline separation rate for general state employees and a 9-percent increase in the baseline rate for teachers.
However, another possible reference point is the percentage reduction in lifetime benefits. As discussed previously, the 2005 reform caused a 48-percent reduction in the pension 39 As before, the modeling assumptions come from the personnel records, the 2005 ERSRI Actuarial Valuation Report, and the 2005 Social Security Trustees Report. 40 The analysis takes a weighted average of male and female mortality rates from 2017 cohort life tables provided by the Social Security Office of the Chief Actuary.
wealth of a typical non-vested ERSRI member, implying that the elasticity of labor supply with regard to pension wealth is around 0.25. 41 By the same logic, the elasticity of labor supply is around 0.18 for teachers and 0.40 for state employees. In summary, the pension reform caused a noticeable disruption to Rhode Island's public sector workforce because the benefit cut was substantial.
The retroactive nature of the pension cut implies a mixture of income and substitution effects that varied across individuals. The cut to accrued benefits is a pure wealth shock that primarily hit medium-tenured workers who had not yet vested, but who anticipated vesting with substantial accruals within the next few years. Reductions in future accruals created both income and substitution incentives for all employees; the income effect could have spurred employees to try to recover the lost wealth by seeking outside jobs with higher pay (perhaps in exchange for fewer amenities); while the substitution effect made outside options appear more attractive than they used to. In addition to the standard income and substitution effects, benefit cuts are an information shock, which could change employee beliefs about the likelihood of future cuts.
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Finally, cuts for current employees -even more than ex nunc reductions -might inspire feelings of spite, particularly among employees who have nearly vested.
Although these theoretical mechanisms suggest that medium-tenure employees may respond differently to the cut than their short-tenure colleagues, the analysis uncovers no evidence of differential effects by tenure. 43 On its face, this finding is consistent with negligible income effects. However, the complex interaction of income, substitution, information, and spite channels, along with the inherent statistical imprecision of heterogeneity analysis on small subsamples, renders firm conclusions about mechanisms challenging in the current context.
Robustness Tests
Any empirical analysis must make design choices that could influence the results. This section conducts several robustness checks to confirm that the main results are not overly sensitive to model specification or the sample selection criteria. As a first robustness check, Column (1) of Table 6 demonstrates that the main triple-differences coefficients do not depend 41 It is likely somewhat smaller because the reform also restricted access to five years of subsidized retiree health insurance, although this represents only a relatively small increase in the PDV of the cuts due to the reform. 42 Indeed, public employees in Rhode Island would have been correct to assume that future cuts were coming. 43 Results not shown, but available from the authors upon request.
on the demographic control variables. Column (2) of Table 6 limits the sample to employees ages 53 and younger with no more than 15 years of tenure, so that no one becomes eligible for normal or early retirement during the analysis period. Similarly, column (3) drops employees with fewer than two years of tenure in 2003, due to concerns about data quality (see the discussion in Appendix B), while column (4) drops corrections officers and nurses with occupation-specific benefit provisions. The main conclusion remains unchanged, even though shrinking the sample attenuates the coefficients slightly and reduces statistical power.
A final robustness check trades the OLS model in equation (1) for a logistic regression.
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Because the estimated coefficients from a logistic model are difficult to interpret, this analysis uses the model to calculate the predicted probability of having separated for the four cohorts of employees, with all control variables held constant at their means. It then takes a linear combination of these predicted probabilities to produce DID and triple-differences estimates. Table 7 compares the DID and triple-differences estimates from the logistic regression with their OLS counterparts. To simplify the exposition, Table 7 shows results for the two-period research design rather than the dynamic triple-differences design. The two sets of estimates are nearly identical.
Conclusion
In 2017, one-third of the large state and local pension systems in the United States were so poorly funded that sponsors may soon attempt to scale back the benefits promised to current employees. This study demonstrates that pension cuts for current workers encourage mid-career civil servants and teachers to leave their government jobs. Specifically, the study evaluates a 2005 reform of Rhode Island's ERSRI that dramatically reduced benefits for K-12 teachers and state employees. The benefit cut caused a 2.4-percentage-point increase in the cumulative probability of separating before 2008, or a 12-percent increase in the pre-reform separation rate.
Since the reform reduced lifetime pension wealth by 48 percent for a typical non-vested member of ERSRI, the results imply an elasticity of labor supply of around 0.25.
Teachers -an important group of government employees -were less responsive to cuts than were state government employees, with the two groups being 1.7-percentage-points and 4-percentage-points more likely to separate, respectively, following the reform. It is possible that state employees (such as lawyers, accountants, clerks, and maintenance workers) have alternative employment opportunities in the private sector that K-12 teachers lack. This interpretation suggests that policymakers should be cautious when extrapolating from studies of teacher labor markets to the broad state and local government workforce, of which teachers only comprise 30 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2017b).
Since Rhode Island is a small state integrated into a larger New England labor market, the elasticity of labor supply estimated here might be larger than that in more isolated states.
Nevertheless, it seems generalizable to the other Northeastern governments that are in financial difficulty, as well as to municipal governments with troubled pensions nationwide. Lessons learned from Rhode Island could soon apply in Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and New York City, among other jurisdictions where one or more pension systems for teachers or civil servants were less than 60 percent funded in 2017. In short, pension cuts for current workers may be considered to shore up troubled systems, but sponsors might want to prepare for their likely and real effects on the government workforce. Table A1 . Benefit Provisions Pre-Reform (2003 and Post-Reform (2005 -2008 
Appendix B: Methodology for Linking Personnel Records over Time
The personnel records provided by the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island did not include a unique numerical identifier that tracks individuals over time. This appendix provides a description of the matching procedure used create the missing identification number.
The procedure employs three steps, described below.
Step 1: Match on Employee Name and Year of Birth
The majority of person-year observations receive an identification number based on a "naive" match of first name, last name, and year of birth. Names are cleaned to standardize inconsistencies across time by removing all spaces and punctuation, and changing Arabic numerals to Roman numerals (i.e. John Smith 111 became John Smith III). Because Rhode Island is a small state, less than one percent of observations in any given year have duplicate names and years of birth. Because they are so uncommon, the analysis drops these duplicate observations.
Step 2 current and prior fiscal year; 2) current and prior-year wages; 3) current and prior-year tenure, where prior-year tenure is calculated as current tenure minus one; 4) sex; and 5) year of birth.
Fortunately, these matching criteria are sufficiently detailed (and the Rhode Island public workforce is sufficiently small) that only three temporal discontinuities could potentially match to more than one other. In these rare cases, the algorithm does not attempt to assign a match.
Steps 3: Match Part-Time Employees Based on Prior-Year Wages and Active Status
Step 2 only matches employees who earn a full year of service credit and ignores parttime employees. To rectify this omission, Step 3 replicates the procedure in Step 2 for any remaining temporal discontinuities, but only requires that tenure in the prior year be no greater than tenure in the current year. In order to limit the number of potential matches, Step 3 also requires that prior-year status (active, inactive, retired, etc.) be consistent with a current-year variable that records status in the prior year. As before, the matching criteria are sufficiently detailed that only four temporal discontinuities matched with multiple others; the algorithm does not assign a match when it detects duplicates.
Verify Accuracy
Ultimately, 91 percent of employees in the final dataset have identification numbers created by Step 1 only. An additional six percent receive identification numbers created by a combination of Steps 1 and 2, while the remaining three percent are assigned identification numbers based on a combination of all three steps. To check that the identification numbers are accurate, Figures B1-B3 display separation probabilities for member of ERSRI and MERS by occupation and years of accrued tenure. The figures contrast these probabilities with published termination rates from Rhode Island's most recent actuarial experience study (Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island 2017). The two sources should produce the same rates because the official experience study is based on the same employment records employed in this analysis. However, the actuaries receive restricted data that contain employees' Social Security Numbers and so know exactly when an employee separates. In general, the rates calculated for this analysis are consistent those published by the actuaries, although this study tends to find less difference between short and long-tenured workers than the actuaries calculate. Importantly, deviations from the official rates are consistent across ERSRI and MERS. 
